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Abstract
Many existing speaker verification systems are reported to
be vulnerable against different spoofing attacks, for example
speaker-adapted speech synthesis, voice conversion, play back,
etc. In order to detect these spoofed speech signals as a counter-
measure, we propose a score level fusion approach with several
different i-vector subsystems. We show that the acoustic level
Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC) features, the phase
level modified group delay cepstral coefficients (MGDCC) and
the phonetic level phoneme posterior probability (PPP) tandem
features are effective for the countermeasure. Furthermore, fea-
ture level fusion of these features before i-vector modeling also
enhance the performance. A polynomial kernel support vec-
tor machine is adopted as the supervised classifier. In order
to enhance the generalizability of the countermeasure, we also
adopted the cosine similarity and PLDA scoring as one-class
classifications methods. By combining the proposed i-vector
subsystems with the OpenSMILE baseline which covers the
acoustic and prosodic information further improves the final
performance. The proposed fusion system achieves 0.29% and
3.26% EER on the development and test set of the database pro-
vided by the INTERSPEECH 2015 automatic speaker verifica-
tion spoofing and countermeasures challenge.
Index Terms: speaker verification, spoofing and counter-
measures, i-vector, modified group delay cepstral coefficients,
phoneme posterior probability
1. Introduction
The goal of speaker verification is to automatically verify the
claimed speaker identity given a segment of speech. In the past
decade, speaker verification has attracted significant research
attention with promising results [1]. However, recently it is re-
ported that many existing speaker verification systems are vul-
nerable against different spoofing attacks, e.g. speaker-adapted
speech synthesis, voice conversion, play back, etc.[2, 3, 4, 5, 6]
Compared to text independent speaker verification, text de-
pendent speaker verification is more robust against the play
back spoofing since the speech content is constrained or pre-
defined. Speaker-adapted speech synthesis and voice conver-
sion are the most common spoofing methods that can con-
vert arbitrary text or speech inputs towards the target speaker
[2]. To enhance the robustness of speech verification system
against spoofing attacks, different countermeasures have been
proposed. In [7], higher-level dynamic features and voice qual-
ity assessment are used to detect those artificial signals. Fur-
thermore, modified group delay cepstral coefficients (MGDCC)
feature has been proposed to distinguish between the original
and the spoofed speech signals in the phase domain [8]. This
approach is based on the fact that the phase information of syn-
thetic spoofing speech is typically different from the real human
articulated speech while the human auditory system is less sen-
sitive to this difference. Long term temporal modulation feature
derived from magnitude or phase spectrum has also been pro-
posed to detect the synthetic speech [9].
Total variability i-vector modeling has been widely used
in speaker verification due to its excellent performance, com-
pact representation and small model size [10, 11]. In this work,
we apply the recently proposed generalized i-vector framework
[12, 13, 14, 15] with both the acoustic and phonetic features to
the countermeasure task.
Figure 1 shows an overview of our anti-spoofing counter-
measure system. First, there are several i-vector subsystems us-
ing different features, namely the acoustic level Mel-frequency
cepstral coefficients (MFCC) features, the phase level MGDCC
features, the phonetic level phoneme posterior probability (PPP)
tandem features [14, 16] and their feature level combinations.
Second, we also applied the openSMILE toolkit [17] to per-
form the utterance level acoustic and prosodic feature extrac-
tion. We believe that the spoofed speech signal may have dif-
ferent prosodic patterns. Third, after the feature normalization,
multiple classification methods, e.g. cosine scoring, K-nearest
neighbor (KNN), simplified PLDA [18] and Support Vector Ma-
chine (SVM), are employed as the back end. Finally, score level
fusion is performed to further enhance the overall system per-
formance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
corpus and the proposed algorithms are explained in Sections
2 and 3, respectively. Experimental results and discussions are
presented in Section 4 while conclusions are provided in Sec-
tion 5.
2. Corpus
The database used to evaluate the proposed methods is based
upon a standard dataset of both genuine and spoofed speech.
Genuine speech is without significant channel or background
noise effect and includes 106 speakers (45 male, 61 female),
while spoofed speech is obtained through applying several
spoofing algorithms on the genuine speech [19]. The train-
ing data set (25 speakers, 3750 genuine utterances and 12635
spoofed utterances) is for model training while the develop-
ment data set (35 speakers, 3497 genuine utterances and 49875
spoofed utterances) is used to evaluate the system performance
and tune the parameters. Finally, the testing data set (46 speak-
ers, 193404 utterances) with unknown types of spoofing attacks
is provided to obtain the official submission scores. The details
of the database and evaluation protocol are provided in [19].
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Figure 1: The system overview
3. Methods
From Figure 1, we can see that there are four different features,
namely MFCC i-vectors, MFCC-PPP i-vectors, MGDCC-PPP
i-vectors and openSMILE feature vectors followed by the
same feature normalization, classification and score level fu-
sion pipeline. We first present the proposed features in section
3.1. Then section 3.2 describes the supervised classification and
score level fusion methods, respectively.
3.1. Features
3.1.1. The i-vector framework
In the total variability space, there is no distinction between
the speaker effects and the channel effects. Rather than sepa-
rately using the eigenvoice matrix V and the eigenchannel ma-
trix U [20], the total variability space simultaneously captures
the speaker and channel variabilities [11]. Given a C com-
ponent GMM UBM model λ with λc = {pc, µc,Σc}, c =
1, · · · , C and an utterance with a L frame feature sequence
{y1, · · · ,yL}, the zero-order and centered first-order Baum-
Welch statistics on the UBM are calculated as follows:
Nc =
L∑
t=1
P (c|yt, λ) (1)
Fc =
L∑
t=1
P (c|yt, λ)(yt − µc) (2)
where c = 1, · · · , C is the GMM component index and
P (c|yt, λ) is the occupancy posterior probability for yt on λc.
The corresponding centered mean supervector F˜ is generated
by concatenating all the F˜c together:
F˜c =
∑L
t=1 P (c|yt, λ)(yt − µc)∑L
t=1 P (c|yt, λ)
. (3)
Then the centered mean supervector F˜ is projected as follows:
F˜→ Tx, (4)
where T is a rectangular low rank total variability matrix and x
is the so-called i-vector [11].
3.1.2. The MFCC i-vector
The MFCC i-vector is extracted by the aforementioned i-vector
framework with the acoustic level MFCC features. For cepstral
feature extraction, a 25ms Hamming window with 10ms shifts
was adopted. Each utterance was converted into a sequence of
36-dimensional feature vectors, each consisting of 18 MFCC
coefficients and their first order derivatives. We employed the
English phoneme recognizer [21] to perform the voice activity
detection (VAD) by simply dropping all frames that are decoded
as silence or speaker noises.
3.1.3. The MFCC-PPP i-vector
It is reported in [14, 15] that by combining the phonetic level
phoneme posterior probability based tandem features with the
acoustic level MFCC features at the feature level, the perfor-
mances on speaker verification and language identification are
significantly enhanced. In this work, the MFCC-PPP i-vector
is extracted the same way as in [14] following the generalized
i-vector framework. We employed the multilayer perceptron
(MLP) based phoneme recognizer [21] with a provided English
acoustic model trained on the TIMIT database to perform the
phoneme decoding. The GMM model size and the tandem fea-
ture dimensionality are 512 and 32, respectively.
3.1.4. The MGDCC-PPP i-vector
The MGDCC-PPP i-vector is calculated the same way as the
MFCC-PPP i-vector except that here we replace the acoustic
System Feature
EER LIBLINEAR LIBPOLY COSINE SCORING KNN Simplified two stage
classification method PLDA PLDA
1 MFCC i-vector 8.46 6.63 16.1 9.95 12.01 17.84
2 PPP i-vector 1.72 1.26 3.6 3.4 2.29
3 MFCC-PPP i-vector 1.86 1.06 2.86 2.46 1.89 10.18
4 MGDCC-MFCC-PPP i-vector 2.97 2.06 6.52 3.43 3.95 17.79
5 OPENSmile 2.03 1.57
6 Fusion 1+2+3+4 1.63 1.37 1.09
7 Fusion 1+2+3+4+5 0.54 0.29
Table 1: Performance of the proposed methods on the development data
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 Average
Fusion 1+2+3+4+5-LIBPOLY 0.1137 1.0332 0.0482 0.0412 0.6614 0.7112 0.2297 0.0108 0.1336 29.6649 3.265
Table 2: Performance of the fusion systems with different spoofing conditions on the testing data
level MFCC features with the phase domain MGDCC features.
The MGDCC feature is a kind of frame-level feature focusing
on the speech phase characteristics. It has been shown that
phase domain features are effective for anti-spoofing counter-
measures [9]. In order to calculate the MGDCC feature, we
need to obtain the modified group delay function phase spec-
trum (MGDFPS) [22] first.
Given the data xn of a short time window, the MGDFPS
spectrum τρ,γ(ω) is calculated as follows [22]:
τρ(ω) =
XR(ω)YR(ω) + YI(ω)XI(ω)
|S(ω)2ρ| (5)
τρ,γ(ω) =
τρ(ω)
|τρ(ω)| |τρ(ω)|
γ (6)
where X(ω) and Y(ω) are the fourier transforms of speech sig-
nal x(n) and nx(n); XR(ω) and XI(ω) are the real and imag-
inary parts of X(ω); YR(ω) and YI(ω) are the real and imag-
inary parts of Y (ω), respectively. |S(ω)|2 is calculated by ap-
plying a smoothing over X(ω) [22]. After applying the Mel-
frequency filter banks and Discrete Cosine Transform, MGDCC
feature is obtained. More details can be found in [9].
3.1.5. The OpenSMILE feature vector
The OpenSMILE feature is a 6373 dimensional utterance level
feature vector extracted by the OpenSMILE toolkit [17] using
the configuration file provided by the 2014 Paralinguistic Chal-
lenge [23]. Since various kinds of features, such as MFCC,
loudness, auditory spectrum, voicing probability, F0, F0 en-
velop, jitter, and shimmer, etc., are included, this feature set can
capture spoofing information at both the acoustic and prosodic
levels. In our system, it served as a baseline as well as a supple-
ment to those i-vector subsystems.
3.2. Back-end modeling
After feature vectors are extracted, we apply different classifi-
cation methods for the back-end modeling.
3.2.1. The K-nearest neighbor classification (KNN)
KNN is a non-parametric multi-class classifier. The utterances
in the training set are divided into human set and spoofed set.
For each test utterance xt,K nearest neighboring utterances are
found in the training set and the score is calculated based on the
class distribution of these K nearest neighbors.
3.2.2. The cosine similarity scoring
The cosine similarity between two vectors is calculated as fol-
lows:
similarity(x,y) =
xty
||x||2||y||2 (7)
In our system, a mean vector of all the human utterances in
the training data set is calculated. For each test utterance, the
score is computed as the cosine similarity between itself and the
human class mean vector.
3.2.3. PLDA modeling
We first applied the simplified PLDA modeling [18] as the back-
end assuming that there are six special speakers (five spoofing
channels plus one human channel), each represents a spoof-
ing type or the original genuine speech. Furthermore, we also
adopted the two subspace (speaker subspace and spoofing sub-
space) PLDA presented in [24] to model the i-vectors. The stan-
dard log likelihood ratio based hypothesis is emploied for the
scoring [18, 24].
3.2.4. Support Vector Machine
We formed the anti-spoofing countermeasure as a two class
classification task for SVM modeling. The linear kernel LIB-
LINEAR [25] and its polynomial kernel extension LIBPOLY
[26] are adopted as the back-end SVM classifiers and we ap-
plied the min/max normalization (range -1 to +1) for each fea-
ture dimension on the training, development and test sets with
parameters computed only from the training data.
3.2.5. Score fusion
We simply employed the weighted summation fusion approach
at the score level to further enhance the performance. The fu-
sion weights were tuned on the development data set.
4. Experimental results
The results of our four subsystems on the development data are
shown in the Table 3. We can observe that feature level fusion
with PPP feature improves the performance. Compared to the
MFCC i-vector subsystem (EER = 6.63%), the EER of MFCC-
PPP i-vector subsystem is reduced to 1.06%. On the other hand,
the openSMILE feature outperformed the MFCC i-vector sub-
system which might be due to the inclusion of prosodic level
information.
Methods EER(%)
MFCC i-vector 6.63
MFCC-PPP i-vector 1.06
MGDCC-PPP i-vector 2.23
OpenSmile 1.57
Table 3: Performance of the four subsystems on the develop-
ment data
polynomial 1 2 3 4 10
kernel degree (LIBLINEAR) (LIBPOLY)
EER 1.86 1.06 1.03 1.00 2.32
Table 4: Performance of the MFCC-PPP i-vector SVM subsys-
tems with different polynomial kernel degrees
Furthermore, to obtain a robust countermeasure system, dif-
ferent backend classification techniques were evaluated. Table 1
shows the performance on the development data. Among these
six classification methods, LIBPOLY achieves the best perfor-
mance with 0.29% EER on the development data. The improve-
ment of LIBPOLY against LIBLINEAR motivated us to further
increase the SVM polynomial kernel degree. Table 4 shows that
SVM with high degree polynomial kernel may lead to overfit-
ting.
With regard to PLDA backends, it shows that the simplified
PLDA tends to be more robust against those unseen spoofing
attacks. As shown in Table 5, we simulated unknown spoofing
attacks by using four kinds of spoofed utterances in the training
and the remaining one in the testing. Although its performance
was as good as LIBLINEAR against familiar spoofing attacks,
it outperformed LIBLINEAR on the unseen testing data, espe-
cially where the unknown attacks were related to speech synthe-
sis (index 3 and 4). The two stage PLDA only achieved mod-
erate results in Table 1 which might be because total speakers
number in the training data is limited (25) and the speaker sub-
space may not be orthogonal to the spoofing subspace.
Table 2 presents our fusion system results with each indi-
vidual spoofing condition on the test data. Here S1 to S5 are
know attacks and S6 to S10 are unknown attacks. Our system
performed well on all attacks except S10, on which most chal-
lenge participants got unsatisfied results.
Finally, our fusion system (system 7) achieved 0.38% and
6.15% EER against known and unknown attacks, respectively.
5. Conclusions
This paper presents an anti-spoofing countermeasure system
based on a multi-feature and multi-subsystem fusion approach.
By fusing the phonetic level phoneme posterior probability tan-
dem features with the acoustic level MFCC features or the
phase level MGDCC features, the system performance is sig-
nificantly enhanced. Combining the proposed i-vector subsys-
tems with the OpenSMILE baseline which covers the acoustic
and prosodic level information further improves the final perfor-
mance. For the back-end modeling, two classes support vector
machine outperforms the one class cosine similarity or PLDA
scoring on the development data where the spoofing attack types
are known. The one class scoring method achieves more robust
performance on the unseen testing data where the spoofing con-
ditions are unknown.
train set test set PLDA LIBLINEAR
human+spoof[2,3,4,5] human+spoof[1] 3.57 3.4
human+spoof[1,3,4,5] human+spoof[2] 4.8 7.69
human+spoof[1,2,4,5] human+spoof[3] 0.2 0.71
human+spoof[1,2,3,5] human+spoof[4] 0.2 0.66
human+spoof[1,2,3,4] human+spoof[5] 4.49 11.81
Table 5: Performance of the LIBLINEAR and the simplified
PLDA backends on the unknown spoofing testing conditions
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